From 2012 Wiki
Template:War Nuclear, or atomic warfare, is a war in which nuclear weapons are used. This has only happened once - the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States of America against the Empire of Japan near the end of World War II. Today the term usually refers to confrontations in which opposing sides are both armed with nuclear weapons.
 Types of nuclear war
The possibility of using nuclear weapons in war is usually divided into two subgroups, each with different effects and potentially fought with different types of nuclear armaments.
The first, a limited nuclear war (sometimes attack or exchange), refers to a small scale use of nuclear weapons by one or more parties. A "limited nuclear war" would most likely consist of a limited exchange between two nuclear superpowers targeting each other's military facilities, either as an attempt to pre-emptively cripple the enemy's ability to attack as a defensive measure or as a prelude to an invasion by conventional forces as an offensive measure. It might also refer to a nuclear war between minor nuclear powers, who lack the ability to deliver a decisive strike. This term would apply to any limited use of nuclear weapons, which may involve either military or civilian targets.
The second, a full-scale nuclear war, consists of large numbers of weapons used in an attack aimed at an entire country, including both military and civilian targets. Such an attack would seek to destroy the entire economic, social, and military infrastructure of a nation by means of an overwhelming nuclear attack. Such a nuclear war would be unlikely to remain contained between only the two countries involved, especially if either of the nuclear superpowers were involved.
Some Cold War strategists argued that a limited nuclear war could be possible between two heavily-armed superpowers (such as the United States and the Soviet Union) and if so several predicted that a limited war could "escalate" into an all-out war. Others have called limited nuclear war "global nuclear holocaust in slow motion" arguing that once such a war took place others would be sure to follow over a period of decades, effectively rendering the planet uninhabitable in the same way that a "full-scale nuclear war" between superpowers would, only taking a much longer and more agonizing path to achieve the same result.
Even the most optimistic predictions about the effects of a major nuclear exchange predict the death of millions of civilians within a very short amount of time; more pessimistic predictions argue that a full-scale nuclear war could bring about the extinction of the human race or its near extinction with a handful of survivors (mainly in remote areas) reduced to a pre-medieval quality of life and life expectancy for centuries after and cause permanent damage to most complex life on the planet, Earth's ecosystems, and the global climate. It is in this latter mode that nuclear warfare is usually alluded to as a doomsday scenario.
A third category, not usually included with the above two, is accidental nuclear war, in which a nuclear war is triggered unintentionally. Possible scenarios for this have included malfunctioning early warning devices and targeting computers, deliberate malfeasance by rogue military commanders, accidental straying of planes into enemy airspace, reactions to unannounced missile tests during tense diplomatic periods, reactions to military exercises, mistranslated or miscommunicated messages, and so forth. A number of these scenarios did actually occur during the Cold War, though none resulted in a nuclear exchange. Many such scenarios have been depicted in popular culture, such as in the 1962 novel Fail-Safe and the 1964 film Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.
 Hiroshima to Semipalatinsk
The United States is the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons during war, having used two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. For more information, see Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
After the bombings of Japan, it was unclear exactly what status the atomic bomb would have for international relations or military actions. It was believed that atomic weapons could offset the superior forces that the Soviet Union had in Eastern Europe, and possibly be used to pressure Soviet leader Joseph Stalin into concessions. But though Stalin feared the bomb, and was pursuing his own atomic capabilities at full speed, they were not as strong a bargaining chip as was hoped by the Americans, as the Russians felt that the Americans were unlikely to begin another world war with their limited nuclear arsenal, and the Americans were not confident that they could prevent the Soviet Union from taking over Europe even if they did use nuclear weapons.
Within the United States the authority to produce and develop nuclear weapons was removed from the military control of the Manhattan Project and put instead under the civilian control of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, a unique move which attempted to recognize that nuclear weapons represented a special category of weapons separate from other military technology.
For several years after World War II, the US developed and maintained a strategic force based on the Convair B-36 bomber that would be able to attack any potential enemy from bomber bases in the US. It deployed atomic bombs around the world for potential use in conflicts. Over a period of a few years, many in the US defense community became increasingly convinced of the invincibility of the United States to a nuclear attack. Indeed, it became generally believed that the threat of nuclear war would deter any strike against the United States.
Many proposals were suggested to put all US nuclear weapons under international control—for example, by the newly-formed United Nations—as an effort to deter both their usage and an arms race. However no terms could be arrived at that made either the United States or the USSR feel secure—the US was not willing to give up its atomic monopoly, and the USSR did not trust UN inspections on its soil.
On August 29, 1949 the USSR tested its first nuclear weapon at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan (see also Soviet atomic bomb project). Scientists in the United States from the Manhattan Project had warned that in time, the Soviet Union would certainly develop nuclear capabilities of its own. Nevertheless, the effect upon military thinking and planning in the US was dramatic, primarily due to the fact that American military strategists had not anticipated the Soviets would 'catch up' so soon. However, at this time, they had not discovered that the Russians had conducted significant espionage of the project from spies at Los Alamos, the most significant of which was done by the theoretical physicist Klaus Fuchs. The first Soviet bomb was more or less a deliberate copy of the Fat Man device.
With the monopoly over nuclear technology broken, world-wide nuclear proliferation accelerated. The United Kingdom tested its first independent atomic bomb in 1952, followed by France in 1960 and then the People's Republic of China in 1964. While much smaller than the arsenals of the USA and the USSR, Western Europe's nuclear reserves were nevertheless a significant factor in strategic planning during the Cold War. A top-secret white paper produced for the British Government in 1959, compiled by the Royal Air Force, estimated that British atomic bombers were capable of destroying key cities and military targets in the Soviet Union, with an estimated 16 million deaths in the USSR (half of whom were estimated to be killed on impact and the rest fatally injured) before bomber aircraft from the United States' Strategic Air Command reached their targets.
Though the USSR had nuclear weapon capabilities in the beginning of the Cold War, the US still had an advantage in terms of bombers and weapons. In any exchange of hostilities, the US would have been capable of bombing the USSR, while the USSR would have more difficulties arranging the reverse.
The widespread introduction of jet-powered interceptor aircraft upset this balance somewhat by reducing the effectiveness of the US bomber fleet. In 1949 Curtis LeMay was placed in command of the Strategic Air Command and instituted a program to update the bomber fleet to one that was all-jet. During the early 1950s the B-47 and B-52 were introduced, providing the ability to bomb the USSR more easily.
Before the development of a capable strategic missile force in the Soviet Union, much of the war-fighting doctrine held by western nations revolved around using a large number of smaller nuclear weapons used in a tactical role. It is arguable if such use could be considered "limited" however, because it was believed that the US would use their own strategic weapons (mainly bombers at the time) should the USSR deploy any kind of nuclear weapon against civilian targets. Douglas MacArthur, an American general, was fired by President Harry Truman, partially because he persistently demanded to conduct a nuclear attack on the People's Republic of China in 1951 (as the Korean War was raging).
Several scares about the increasing ability of the USSR's strategic bomber forces surfaced during the 1950s. The defensive response by the US was to deploy a fairly strong layered defense consisting of interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles, like the Nike, and guns, like the Skysweeper, near larger cities. However this was a small response compared to the construction of a huge fleet of nuclear bombers. The principal nuclear strategy was to massively penetrate the USSR. Because such a large area could not be defended against this overwhelming attack in any credible way, the USSR would lose any exchange.
This logic became ingrained in US nuclear doctrine and persisted for the duration of the Cold War. As long as the strategic US nuclear forces could overwhelm their USSR counterparts, a Soviet preemptive strike could be averted. Moreover, the USSR could not afford to build any reasonable counterforce as the economic output of the United States was far larger than that of the Soviets, and they would be unable to achieve nuclear parity.
Soviet nuclear doctrine however did not match US nuclear doctrine. Soviet planning expected a large scale nuclear exchange followed by a conventional war which itself would involved heavy use of tactical nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, US doctrine rather assumed that Soviet doctrine was similar - the "mutual" in Mutually Assured Destruction necessarily requiring that the other side rather sees things in much the same way, rather than believing, as the Soviets in fact did, that they could and would fight a large scale combined nuclear and conventional war, and where the US believed they understood Soviet doctrine but in fact did not and so were mis-perceiving Soviet signals and mis-predicting Soviet behaviour, meant that this was one of the greatest errors and dangers of the Cold War.
A revolution in nuclear strategic thought occurred with the introduction of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which the USSR first successfully tested in May 1957. In order to deliver a warhead to a target, a missile was more cost-effective than a bomber, and enjoyed a higher survivability due to the enormous difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of interception of the ICBMs due to their high altitude and speed. The USSR could now afford to achieve nuclear parity with the US in terms of raw numbers, although for a time they appeared to have chosen not to.
Photos of Soviet missile sites set off a wave of panic in the US military, something the launch of Sputnik would do for the public a few months later. Politicians, notably then-US Senator John Kennedy suggested a "missile gap" between the Soviets and the US. The US military gave missile development programs the highest national priority, and several spy aircraft and reconnaissance satellites were designed and deployed to check on Soviet progress.
 The 1960s
Issues came to a head during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The Soviet Union placed medium range missiles ninety miles from the US--a move considered by many as a direct response to American Jupiter missiles placed in Turkey; however, these Jupiter missiles were already somewhat obsolete. After intense negotiation, the Soviets ended up removing the missiles from Cuba and decided to institute a massive building program of their own. In exchange, the US dismantled its launch sites in Turkey although this was done secretly and not publicly revealed for over two decades. Khrushchev did not even reveal this part of the agreement when he came under fire by political opponents for mishandling the crisis. By the late 1960s the number of ICBMs and warheads was so high on both sides that either the USA or USSR was capable of completely destroying the other country's infrastructure. Thus a balance of power system known as mutually assured destruction (MAD) came into being. It was thought that any full-scale exchange between the powers could not produce a victorious side and thus neither would risk initiating one.
One drawback of this doctrine was the possibility of a nuclear war occurring without either side intentionally striking first. Early warning systems are notoriously error-prone. On 78 occasions in 1979, for example, a "missile display conference" was called to evaluate detections potentially threatening to the North American continent. Some of these were trivial errors, spotted quickly. But several went to more serious levels. It is claimed that on 26 September 1983, Stanislav Petrov received convincing indications of a US first strike launch against the USSR - but had the instinct that it was a computer error and, contrary to his orders, sat on his hands.Template:Fact It is however most unlikely that he was all that stood between the world and thermonuclear war.
Similar incidents happened many times in the US, due to failed computer chips, flights of geese, test programs, bureaucratic failures to notify early warning military personnel of legitimate launches of test or weather missiles. And for many years, US strategic bombers were kept airborne on a rotating basis round the clock until the sheer number and gravity of accidents persuaded policymakers it was not worth it.
 The 1970s
By the late 1970s, citizens in the US and USSR (and indeed the entire world) had been living with MAD for about a decade. It became deeply ingrained into the popular culture. Such an exchange would have killed many millions of individuals directly and possibly induced a nuclear winter which could have led to the death of a large portion of humanity and certainly the collapse of global civilization.
According to the 1980 United Nations report General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General, it was estimated that in total there were approximately 40,000 nuclear warheads in existence at that time with a total yield of approximately 13,000 megatons of TNT. By comparison, when the volcano Mount Tambora erupted in 1815 (turning 1816 into the Year Without A Summer due to the levels of ash expelled), it exploded with a force of roughly 1000 megatons of TNT. Many people believed that a full-scale nuclear war could result in the extinction of the human species, though not all analysts agreed on the assumptions required for these models.
The idea that any nuclear conflict would eventually escalate into MAD was a challenge for military strategists. This challenge was particularly severe for the United States and its NATO allies because it was believed until the 1970s that a Soviet tank invasion of Western Europe would quickly overwhelm NATO conventional forces, leading to the necessity of escalating to theater nuclear weapons.
A number of interesting concepts were developed. Early ICBMs were inaccurate, which led to the concept of countervalue strikes -- attacks directly on the enemy population leading to a collapse of the enemy's will to fight. However, it appears that this was the American interpretation of the Soviet stance while the Soviet strategy was never clearly anti-population. During the Cold War the USSR invested in extensive protected civilian infrastructure such as large nuclear proof bunkers and non-perishable food stores. In the US, by comparison, little to no preparations were made for civilians at all, except for the occasional backyard fallout shelter built by private individuals.
The US also made a point during this period of targeting their missiles on Russian population centers rather than military targets. If the Soviets attacked first, then there would be no point in destroying empty missile silos that had already launched; the only thing left to hit would be cities. By contrast, if America had gone to great lengths to protect their citizens and targeted the enemy's silos, that might have led the Russians to believe the US was planning a first strike, where they would eliminate Soviet missiles while still in their silos and be able to survive a weakened counter attack in their reinforced bunkers. In this way, both sides were (theoretically) assured that the other would not strike first, and a war without a first strike will not occur.
This strategy had one major and possibly critical flaw, soon realised by military analysts but highly underplayed by the US military: Conventional NATO forces in the European theatre of war were considered to be outnumbered by similar Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, and while the western countries invested heavily in high-tech conventional weapons to counter this (partly perceived) imbalance, it was assumed that in case of a major Soviet attack (commonly perceived as the 'red tanks rolling towards the North Sea' scenario) that NATO, in the face of conventional defeat, would soon have no other choice but to resort to tactical nuclear strikes. Most analysts agreed that once the first nuclear exchange had occurred, escalation to global nuclear war would become almost inevitable.
So, while official US policy was that nuclear weapons were "weapons of last resort", the reality was that the lack of strength of conventional NATO forces would force the US to either abandon Western Europe or use nuclear weapons in its defense. Official NATO doctrine had been critically flawed from the outset and nuclear war would have been a very real possibility had actual conflict occurred.
This major flaw, although largely ignored by the military community, quickly gathered public interest and many movies and books were based upon this and several other weaknesses in the policy of mutually assured destruction.
As missile technology improved, the emphasis moved to counter-force strikes: ones that directly attacked the enemy's means of waging war. This was the predominant doctrine from the late 1960s onwards. Additionally the development of warheads (at least in the US) moved towards delivering a small explosive force more accurately and with a "cleaner" blast (with fewer long-lasting radioactive isotopes). In any conflict therefore, damage would have been initially limited to military targets, there may well have been 'withholds' for targets near civilian areas. The argument was that the destruction of a city would be a military advantage to the attacked. The enemy had used up weapons and a threat in the destruction while the attacked was relieved of the need to defend the city and still had their entire military potential untouched.
Only if a nuclear conflict were extended into a number of 'spasm' strikes would direct strikes against civilians occur, as the more accurate weapons would be expended early; if one side was 'losing', the potential for using less accurate submarine-launched missiles would occur.
 The 1980s
There was a growing shift to the USSR which was slowly gaining an advantage in terms of weapons.
Another major shift in nuclear doctrine was the development of the submarine-based nuclear missile, the SLBM. It was hailed by some military theorists as a weapon that would make nuclear war less likely. SLBMs, which can move with stealth virtually anywhere in the world, give a nation a "second strike" capability. Before the advent of SLBMs, thinkers feared that a nation might be tempted to initiate a first strike if it felt confident that such a strike would incapacitate the nuclear arsenal of its enemy, making retaliation impossible. With the advent of SLBMs, no nation could be certain that a first strike would incapacitate its enemy's entire nuclear arsenal. To the contrary, it would have to fear a retaliatory second strike from SLBMs. Thus a first strike was much less of a feasible option, and nuclear war was held to be less likely.
However, it was soon realized that submarines could 'sneak up' close to enemy coastlines and decrease the 'warning time'- the time between detection of the launch and impact of the missile - from as much as half an hour to under three minutes. This effect was especially significant to the United States, Britain, and China, with their capitals all within Template:Convert of their coasts. Moscow was more secure from this type of threat. This greatly increased the credibility of a 'surprise first strike' by one of the factions and theoretically made it possible to knock out or disrupt the chain of command before a counterstrike could be ordered. It strengthened the notion that a nuclear war could be 'won', resulting not only in greatly increased tension, and increasing calls for fail-deadly control systems, but also in a dramatic increase in military spending. The submarines and their missile systems were very expensive (one fully equipped nuclear powered nuclear missile submarine could easily cost more than the entire GNP of a third world nation), but the greatest cost came in the development of both sea- and land-based anti-submarine defenses and in improving and strengthening the chain of command. As a result, military spending skyrocketed.
 Post-Cold War
Although the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War and greatly reduced tensions between the United States and Russia, both nations remained in a "nuclear stand-off" due to the continuing presence of a significant number of warheads in both nations. Additionally, the end of the Cold War led the United States to become increasingly concerned with the development of nuclear technology by other nations outside of the former Soviet Union. In 1995, a branch of the U.S. Strategic Command produced an outline of forward-thinking strategies in the document "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence".
The former chair of the United Nations disarmament committee states there are more than 16,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons ready for deployment and another 14,000 in storage. The U.S. has nearly 7,000 ready for action and 3,000 in storage and Russia has about 8,500 on hand and 11,000 in storage, he said. China has 400 nuclear weapons, France 350, Britain 200, India 95, and Pakistan 50. North Korea is confirmed as having nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many (a common estimate is between 1 and 10). Also, despite denials, Israel is also widely believed to have nuclear weapons.Template:Fact NATO has stationed 480 U.S. nuclear weapons in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and Turkey, with several other countries in pursuit of an arsenal of their own (1).
A key development in nuclear warfare in the 2000s has been the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the developing world, with Pakistan and India both publicly testing nuclear devices and North Korea conducting an underground nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The U.S. Geological Survey measured a 4.2 magnitude earthquake in the area where the test occurred. Iran, meanwhile, has embarked on a nuclear program which, while officially for civilian purposes, has come under scrutiny by the United Nations and individual states.
 Current concerns
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, conflict between the United States and Russia appears much less likely. Stockpiles of nuclear warheads are being reduced on both sides, and tensions between the two countries have been greatly reduced. The concerns of political strategists have now shifted to other areas of the world.
Recent studies undertaken by the CIA cite the enduring India-Pakistan conflict as the most likely to escalate into nuclear war. During the Kargil War in 1999, Pakistan came close to using their nuclear weapons in case of further deterioration. (BBC) In fact, Pakistan's foreign minister had even warned that they would "use any weapon in our arsenal," hinting at a nuclear strike against India; the statement was condemned by the international community with Pakistan denying it later on. It remains the only war between two declared nuclear powers.
The 2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoff again stoked fears of nuclear war between the two countries.
Despite these very serious threats, relations between India and Pakistan have been improving somewhat over the last few years. A bus line directly linking Indian and Pakistani administered Kashmir has recently been established.
Another flashpoint which has analysts worried is a possible conflict between the United States and the People's Republic of China over Taiwan. Although economic forces have decreased the possibility of military conflict, there remains the worry that increasing military buildup and a move toward Taiwan independence could spin out of control.
A third potential flashpoint lies in the Middle East, where Israel is thought to possess between one and four hundred nuclear warheads (this has never been officially confirmed by Israel; however, Mordechai Vanunu, the former nuclear technician on whose 1986 revelations much of the above is based, was kidnapped by Mossad agents from Italy, spent 18 years in detention on charges of "grave espionage", and is still forbidden to leave Israel and is subject to severe restrictions - which tend to lend credence to what he told the British Sunday Times). Further, persistent rumors in the international press Template:Cite (likewise never confirmed by Israel) assert that the submarines which Israel received from Germany have been adapted to carry missiles with nuclear warheads, so as to give Israel a Second strike capacity. Israel has been involved in wars with its neighbours on numerous occasions, and its small geographic size would mean that in the event of future wars the Israeli military might have very little time to react to a future invasion or other major threat; the situation could escalate to nuclear warfare very quickly in some scenarios. In addition, the fact that Iran appears to many observers to be in the process of developing a nuclear weapon has heightened fears of a nuclear conflict in the Middle East, either with Israel or with Iran's Sunni neighbours.
 Potential consequences of a regional nuclear war
A study presented at the annual meeting of the American Geophysical Union in December 2006 asserted that even a small-scale, regional nuclear war could produce as many direct fatalities as all of World War II and disrupt the global climate for a decade or more. In a regional nuclear conflict scenario where two opposing nations in the subtropics would each use 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (ca. 15 kiloton each) on major populated centers, the researchers estimated fatalities from 2.6 million to 16.7 million per country. Also, as much as five million tons of soot would be released, which would produce a cooling of several degrees over large areas of North America and Eurasia, including most of the grain-growing regions. The cooling would last for years and could be "catastrophic" according to the researchers. 
 Sub-strategic use
The above examples envisage nuclear warfare at a strategic level, i.e. total war. However, many nuclear powers are believed to have the ability to launch more limited engagements.
The United Kingdom has reserved the possibility of launching a sub-strategic nuclear strike against an enemy, described by its Parliamentary Defence Select Committee as "the launch of one or a limited number of missiles against an adversary as a means of conveying a political message, warning or demonstration of resolve". This would see the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons in a very limited role rather than the battlefield exchanges of tactical nuclear weapons.
British Trident SSBN submarines are believed to carry some missiles for this purpose, potentially allowing a strike as low as one kiloton against a single target. Former Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind argued that this capacity offset the reduced credibility of fullscale strategic nuclear attack following the end of the Cold War.
Commodore Tim Hare, former Director of Nuclear Policy at the UK's Ministry of Defence, has described it as offering the Government "an extra option in the escalatory process before it goes for an all-out strategic strike which would deliver unacceptable damage" .
However, this sub-strategic capacity has been criticised as potentially increasing the acceptability of using nuclear weapons. The related consideration of new generations of limited yield battlefield nuclear weapons by the United States has also alarmed anti-nuclear groups, who believe it will make the use of nuclear weapons more acceptable.
 Nuclear terrorism
Nuclear terrorism by non-state organizations may be more likely, as states possessing nuclear weapons are susceptible to retaliation in kind. Geographically-dispersed and mobile terrorist organizations are not so easy to discourage by the threat of retaliation. Furthermore, while the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, it greatly increased the risk that former Soviet nuclear weapons might become available on the black market. Indeed, it has been alleged that several suitcase-size bombs might have become available. Using such a weapon as a foundation, a terrorist might even create a salted bomb capable of dispersing radioactive contamination over a large area, killing a greater number of people than the explosion itself. A similar threat exists with so-called dirty bombs.
Taking a different tack, South Africa declared after its transition from an apartheid regime that it had in fact produced about six crude nuclear weapons as a 'last-resort' weapon for military and/or state control purposes, but that they have now been destroyed. In fact, the development laboratories and storage facilities have now become a sight-seeing tour.
- ↑ Alan F. Philips, 20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War.
- ↑ Template:Cite news
 See also
- Deterrence theory
- Doomsday clock
- Doomsday event
- Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence
- International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
- No first use policy
- Nuclear holocaust
- Nuclear War (card game)
- Nuclear weapons in popular culture
- Square Leg
- Weapons of mass destruction
- World War III
- Risks to civilization, humans and planet Earth
- Causes of hypothetical future disasters
 External links and references
- The Effects of Nuclear War (1979) — handbook produced by the United States Office of Technology Assessment (hosted by the Federation of American Scientists)
- Nuclear War Survival Skills (1979/1987) — handbook produced by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (use menu at left to navigate)
- Nuclear News at HavenWorks.com
- 20 Mishaps That Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War by Alan F. Philips, M.D.
- US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
- Nuclear Files.org Interactive Timeline of the Nuclear Age
- Iranian Nuclear Timeline
- DeVolpi, Alexander, Vladimir E. Minkov, Vadim A. Simonenko, and George S. Stanford. 2004. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry, Vols. 1 and 2. Fidlar Doubleday.